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Organization Studies
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0170840606067990v1
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Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

Bryan W. Husted

Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Mexico, Instituto de Empresa, Spain

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

Key Words: agency theory • information • incentives • ethical problems

This version was published on February 1, 2007

Organization Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, 177-195 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0170840606067990
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[Abstract] [PDF]