Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here for more information on the Handbook of Organizational and Managerial Wisdom

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Organization Studies
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Nilakant, V.
Right arrow Articles by Rao, H.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?

Agency Theory and Uncertainty in Organizations: An Evaluation

V. Nilakant

Department of Management, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Hayagreeva Rao

Emory Business School, Emory University, Atlanta, U.S.A.

This paper evaluates agency theory as a theory of performance outcome. Agency theory attributes uncertainty in performance outcomes to moral hazard, adverse selection and the state of nature. This paper argues that by overlooking two critical sources of outcome uncertainty in organizations — incomplete knowledge about the effort-outcome relationship and lack of agreement about effort and outcome — the generalizability of the theory is strictly limited. Even in such settings where it is generalizable, principal-agent approaches to contract design are unrealistic to the extent that they presume that performance in organizations results exclusively from individual-contributor jobs, exagger ate the degree to which individuals are work-averse, and emphasize the quant ity of effort at the expense of the quality and type of effort. As a theory of performance, principal-agent approaches overstate the importance of opera tional effort and ignore the importance of facilitative effort such as team work.

Organization Studies, Vol. 15, No. 5, 649-672 (1994)
DOI: 10.1177/017084069401500501


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
American Politics ResearchHome page
P. C. Corley
Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions
American Politics Research, January 1, 2009; 37(1): 30 - 49.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Advances in Developing Human ResourcesHome page
R. E. Azevedo and M. Akdere
The Economics of Utility, Agency, Theory, and Human Resource Development
Advances in Developing Human Resources, December 1, 2008; 10(6): 817 - 833.
[Abstract] [PDF]